'Reasons why' - the enigma of Captain Nolan's intentions

[jf42]

FORUM STAFF NOTE: Topic was split off from this thread:

[b][i] I think it was likely that Nolan, familiar with the overview from the heights above, was concentrating on getting the Brigade to move and did not at first realise that the view from the plains obscured the overall picture. His vague gesture indicating the general direction of the desired movement gave the impression that the target was the batteries at the end of the valley and he was unaware at first that the true objective was unsighted. Hence his ill fated attempt to change the direction of the advance.

An interesting thought. Mark Adkin, who examined the question on the ground from the point of view of what each protagonist could see at any one time, points out that for the first 200 hundred yards or so the Light Brigade would have taken the same line, whether it was intended to move against the captured redoubts on Causeway Heights or attack the battery in the North Valley. An advance directly along the line of the Heights would have been impractical for cavalry. Apparently, the Russian infantry screening the redoubts were already forming squares in expectation of an attack from the North Valley.

Adkin calculates that Captain Nolan had left his position with the 17th Lancers and was riding forward before it would have become apparent that Lord Cardigan was not going to wheel the brigade to the right and attack the Causeway Heights as Lord Raglan intended.

That conclusion doesn't rule out the possibility that Nolan, having recklessly goaded Lord Lucan and realising the enormity of his action, was riding forward to correct the error- although that does seem to veer into the realms of Victorian melodrama. There seems little doubt, however, that those present when Nolan delivered the order to attack, with those famous clarifying remarks, all believed the intended objective was the battery in North Valley.

It seems fairly clear from the most reliable witness reports that Nolan's horse only turned across the front of the brigade after he was hit. Any talk of Nolan actually calling out orders to wheel right as he died seems to have been veterans' romance.

[L. Braden]

Not according to Terry Brighton et al.!
Unlike Cpl. Nunnerley, who claimed that Nolan shouted what sounded like "Threes right" when he was hit, Cpl. Morley claimed that Nolan shouted "Threes right", pointed his sword in that direction, turned his horse and galloped toward the heights, still pointing his sword in that direction, and THEN was struck down by a shell burst. So, believe whoever you will!
But in any case, there's no easy explanation for Nolan's erratic behavior!

[Swordswoman]

This is a really fascinating discussion, and I wonder if it ought to have its own thread.

I think Mark Adkin does give the best all-round analysis of the issue (though I like Brighton's 'Hell Riders' too) but I can't go with him on his final theory - that Nolan did it on purpose. We just don't have enough evidence to say that definitely, and even Nolan's diary stops abruptly on 12th October without giving us any real indication as to his state of mind.

That said, I can see his argument that Nolan wouldn't have considered a cavalry charge against artillery as ludicrous as we do; that he had known such things succeed, and that in fact this one would have succeeded if Lucan hadn't turned back the Heavies. To me, that simply makes it more likely that that's what Nolan believed Raglan wanted. The Fourth Order was horribly confusing, we only have the word of Raglan's nephew Calthorpe that Nolan was given further 'careful instructions', and it's quite possible Nolan truly believed he was pointing in the right direction. We also have the evidence of Cardigan's ADC Maxse, who wrote that Kinglake's account was 'absurd as to Nolan wanting to charge any other guns than those he did.'

I guess it all comes down to whether or not Nolan made that famous 'turn'. Nunnerley's version is quite consistent with Nolan's scream only sounding like 'Threes Right', but Morley's, as L. Braden says, is much more specific. However, I have my doubts about Morley. His whole account (here:http://www.medalcollector.co.uk/pdf/1349.pdf ) is riddled with hindsight and derived from the books of others, so that he tells us quite confidently what both Lucan and Raglan saw and thought as if these are facts from his own knowledge. He is indeed definite about what he saw Nolan do, but the problem is that nobody else seems to have seen the same thing. None of the other survivors saw something he claims happened in front of all of them, an omission it's impossible to explain - if it really happened.

There's another reason I don't believe in Nolan's 'turn'. Adkin says it can't be true because it was too early for Nolan to have realized they were going the wrong way - ie Cardigan could still have been intending to make the Brigade turn right for the Causeway Heights. I don't agree. I think Nolan would have known where they were going before they even set off because of the specific order Wightman says Cardigan gave - 'First squadron 17th Lancers to direct!' The Lancers were on the LEFT of the line, and that would have told everyone Cardigan was not intending to wheel to the RIGHT.

And that's the other point. Everyone did know - that's the one thing all the eyewitnesses agree on. OK, some of that might be 'wise after the event', a kind of 'I knew we were doomed from the start', but it's hard to discount ALL those statements like that. And if everyone knew, officers as well as men, then it really, really strains credibility to claim the one man who didn't was Nolan.

Personally I think he knew, and he believed it was what Raglan wanted. But it's only a theory and I've stuck with the conventional account in my book (for reasons I've blogged about here: http://the-history-girls.blogspot.co.uk ... igade.html ). As Jonathan says, I doubt we'll ever know for sure.

But it's still fascinating thrashing it out, and I'd love to know what other members think.

Louise

[jf42]

...I can see his argument that Nolan wouldn't have considered a cavalry charge against artillery as ludicrous as we do; that he had known such things succeed, and that in fact this one would have succeeded if Lucan hadn't turned back the Heavies. To me, that simply makes it more likely that that's what Nolan believed Raglan wanted.... and it's quite possible Nolan truly believed he was pointing in the right direction.

I think Nolan would have known where they were going before they even set off because of the specific order Wightman says Cardigan gave - 'First squadron 17th Lancers to direct!' The Lancers were on the LEFT of the line, and that would have told everyone Cardigan was not intending to wheel to the RIGHT.
Personally I think he knew, and he believed it was what Raglan wanted.

That seems to me a most telling detail. If Cardigan's reference to the 17th Lancers in his order made it evident that no right wheel was intended then Nolan can hardly have been surprised to find the Brigade was advancing directly down the North Valley. How intriguing that no one has observed that before.

Of course, one might argue that, such was his excitement, the matter only dawned on Nolan gradually but I still find the notion that he might have been trying to divert the Light Brigade dramatic but unconvincing.

I confess, I am still not clear what Nolan might have thought Raglan wanted to achieve with an cavalry advance on the Cossack battery (as opposed to an advance in support of the infantry attack on the Russians troops occupying Causeway Heights- however questionable that objective might have been, itself).

True, the Cossack battery was silenced by the Light Brigade, but it seems to me that at the time the only threat those guns posed was to any force attacking it. True, they screened the Russian cavalry in the position to which they had retreated after their check by the Heavy Brigade but I don't think there is any suggestion that the protagonists thought Raglan's ultimate concern was the enemy cavalry behind the guns.

I now realise, I am not sure what it is that Adkin thinks would ultimately have been achieved if the Heavy Brigade had ridden in support as intended. Is it possible that the Russians on Causeway Heights might have been forced to withdraw if the British Cavalry Division (or what was left of them) had occupied the entrance to the North Valley?

It seems either of the possible interpretations of Raglan's order would have led the Light Brigade into trouble. Is it likely Nolan would have accepted that the Cavalry should play it safe and simply 'look on' once again? Maybe the truth is he didn't care much which way the Light Brigade went as long as they attacked the enemy. His confidence in the efficacy of cavalry seems to have been such that he believed the Cavalry Division, however they were engaged, must influence the course of the battle and with discipline and courage would prevail.

[Swordswoman]

I confess, I am still not clear what Nolan might have thought Raglan wanted to achieve with an cavalry advance on the Cossack battery (as opposed to an advance in support of the infantry attack on the Russians troops occupying Causeway Heights- however questionable that objective might have been, itself).

This is an excellent point. As you say, the Don Cossack battery posed no immediate threat, and its only obvious purpose in that position would have been to cover a Russian retreat over that desperately narrow bridge across the aqueduct. It would certainly have been a nuisance had the British indeed attempted to retake the redoubts, since the Arabtabia on the crest was within its range, but that still doesn’t seem to me a sufficiently convincing reason to attack it.

More importantly, an attack for that purpose is in no way implied by Raglan’s Fourth Order. Whatever Nolan believed has to be consistent with that, and that’s where I have one possible theory to offer. Airey wrote very clearly that the mission was to ‘try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns’ – but he did not say WHICH guns. Mightn’t Nolan (and indeed Lucan) have thought that the Russians were withdrawing their own guns?

This seems pretty daft, but it’s totally consistent with what we’ve already seen at the Alma. The sense of disgrace in losing one’s guns was common to both sides, and was matched only by the desire to capture those of the enemy. Menschikov certainly thought this way, and at the first sign of trouble at the Greater Redoubt at the Alma he ordered the guns to be withdrawn. The effect on the attacking Light Division was electric, and several witnesses record the cries of ‘Gone Away! Gone Away!’ as they charged even faster to capture the retreating guns.

Might this not have been what Nolan thought was happening at Balaklava?

The tide really did seem to be turning. The 93rd had held, and Nolan would have seen the magnificent Charge of the Heavy Brigade. The infantry were also finally arriving. The First Division was at the Col, and the Fourth Division already advancing on Number 4 redoubt, and if Lucan couldn’t see them then Nolan certainly could. If someone had said ‘The Russians are taking away the guns!’, I think it would have been natural to assume that they were withdrawing, and it was time for the cavalry to mop up – as Nolan says in his diary they should have done at the Alma.

If that was the case it could explain a lot. It certainly accounts for the high spirits with which he arrived, calling out to Morris ‘You’ll see! You’ll see!’ – as well as the remark Morley claims to have heard, saying to Morris ‘Now for some fun!’ It also explains why he doesn’t appear to have been troubled by the obvious sense of doom felt by everyone else. Down in the North Valley the Cossack battery were no more than blobs in the distance, and no-one could have seen whether or not the guns were being backed to limber. Only Nolan would have been confident there was little real danger, since Raglan had effectively told him the Russians were withdrawing.

Of course, this is all speculation – but arguably no more so than the theory that he pointed the wrong way. It’s still Nolan’s mistake, but it wasn’t made in the North Valley with Lucan, but up on the Sapoune when Airey was careless with the definite article (‘the’ guns) and Raglan failed to explain.

I don’t know. I wish I did. Are there any obvious holes in this that I’ve missed?

You make a number of other crucial points too, but I’ll have to come back to those or this is going to turn into an essay!

[jf42]

Airey wrote very clearly that the mission was to ‘try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns’ – but he did not say WHICH guns. Mightn’t Nolan (and indeed Lucan) have thought that the Russians were withdrawing their own guns?

It's a thought.

The Light Brigade [EDITED- should read 'Light Division'] at the Alma were already advancing up the Heights of Alma when they saw the guns were being withdrawn from the redoubt ahead, cheating them of the prize for which they had already put themselves at hazard. The chase was already on, as it were, hence the cry of the green jacket officers that went up- "Gone Away."

I recently came upon a military adage, the source of which I can't recall, which says, "Never impede an retreating enemy," (Or similar).

My instinct tells me (for what it's worth) that to everyone- except Louis Nolan, perhaps, I grant you- a battery of Russian horse artillery was something that was usually best left well alone and if the Cossack gunners were moving themselves out of range from which they could support their comrades at the redoubts, they should be left to get on with it.

Even to the fired-up and deeply frustrated Nolan an advance to prevent the Cossack guns being withdrawn would hardly have presented itself as a mopping-up operation, with the Russians on both Fedioukine and Causeway Heights positioned to take the pursuing cavalry in enfilade, as we know. After all it wasn't only making a frontal advance on the artillery battery ahead (with supporting cavalry) that was a "mad-brained idea" but passing through the fire of "batteries and riflemen on either flank," as Cardigan pointed out to Lucan in Nolan's presence.

"Carrying away" in Airey's order does suggest to me guns mounted in permanent emplacements rather than on mobile carriages for mobile operations- (they were naval guns in the redoubts, weren't they; or have I got that wrong?).

I suppose we might imagine that if seizing enemy cannon were such a prime objective of the regimental soldier, even Lucan or Cardigan might have said "Are they indeed? Well, we can't have that. Bugler, 'To Horse'!" Instead we get the impression that both generals believed they had been ordered to do something suicidal and probably futile- and, indeed, "contrary to all the usages of warfare and the customs of the service."

Suddenly, I don't find the notion of Nolan suddenly realising he'd screwed up so improbable after all!

[Swordswoman]

Thanks for playing, jf42. I can be a horrible bore on this subject, but you're making some really interesting points.

The Light Brigade at the Alma were already advancing up the Heights of Alma when they saw the guns were being withdrawn from the redoubt ahead, cheating them of the prize for which they had already put themselves at hazard. The chase was already on, as it were, hence the cry of the green jacket officers that went up- "Gone Away."

I'm not sure. According to Kinglake as well as various cavalry sources (eg Paget, Albert Mitchell) the cavalry were actually still on the north side of the Alma when the Light Division took the Greater Redoubt the first time, which is when all the ‘Gone Away!’ hunting cries were made. It was the infantry who were desperate to capture the guns, and eyewitnesses give some wonderfully endearing accounts of men scratching their initials on the captured howitzer to claim it for their regiment. Maybe it's not that relevant here, but I used it only as an example of the way in which British troops would react to the prospect of an enemy withdrawing his guns.

Even to the fired-up and deeply frustrated Nolan an advance to prevent the Cossack guns being withdrawn would hardly have presented itself as a mopping-up operation, with the Russians on both Fedoukine and Causeway Heights positioned to take the pursuing cavalry in enfilade, as we know.

Yes, agreed. 'Mopping up' was a definite exaggeration. All I meant was that Nolan thought the Russians were preparing to withdraw - just as they did at the Alma.

I suppose we might imagine that if seizing enemy cannon were such a prime objective of the regimental soldier, even Lucan or Cardigan might have said "Are they indeed? Well, we can't have that. Bugler, 'To Horse'!" Instead we get the impression that both generals believed they had been ordered to do something suicidal and probably futile- and, indeed, "contrary to all the usages of warfare and the customs of the service."

This is a very fair point. You’re right, and I do think both Cardigan and Lucan would have reacted differently if they’d thought the battery was limbering up. However, the possibility still remains that this is what Nolan himself thought, and why he might have believed the Cossack battery was really what Raglan was after. That’s why his high spirits make such a contrast with those of everyone else.

Interestingly, I’ve since found an article by Crimean expert David Kelsey (http://crimeantexts.russianwar.co.uk/topics/deluded.html) which implies that Raglan himself believed the Russians were retreating. That does seem oddly credible, because it’s unlikely the Russians would have attempted to withdraw even the captured guns if they were intending to hold the position. If that really is what Raglan thought (and again it’s only a theory) then it would certainly explain why Nolan might have picked up the idea in the first place, even if he was mistaken as to which guns were actually meant.

(Of course, we know now the Russians weren't attempting to withdraw any guns at all, but I'm only trying to get at what it was that Raglan at least thought he was doing!)

But to return to your earlier points:

Yes, I haven't seen anyone else discuss the ‘take direction’ part of Cardigan’s order - it's possible only people interested in period cavalry manoeuvres would see its significance. Wightman is (I think) the only one who gives it word for word, but others also refer to the Lancers being the squadron ‘of direction’ so I think it’s pretty solid. Interestingly, Lord George Paget promptly followed suit, and tells us in his memoir that he added the caution to his own regiments – ‘4th Light Dragoons to direct!’ Again, the 4th LD were riding to the left of the line.

I now realise, I am not sure what it is that Adkin thinks would ultimately have been achieved if the Heavy Brigade had ridden in support as intended. Is it possible that the Russians on Causeway Heights might have been forced to withdraw if the British Cavalry Division (or what was left of them) had occupied the entrance to the North Valley?

I’m embarrassed to say I never thought of that. I agree with Adkin that if the Heavies had supported then the cavalry would have held the battery, but it never occurred to me to ask what this would have achieved!

And I think you’re right. Had the British held that battery they would have controlled the Woronzoff and the Russian position in the redoubts would have become untenable. They would have been cut off from their battery on the Fedoukhine (which the Chasseurs took anyway), and as more British infantry arrived they’d have been surrounded on all sides. The way to the aqueduct would be blocked, and their only hope would have been the long retreat back to Traktir Bridge – no doubt pursued all the way. Hmm. Quite a thought!

But that still doesn’t (in my opinion) justify so suicidal an action as that charge. True, if Lucan had supported with the Heavies then the Light Brigade would not have been sacrificed in vain, but that doesn’t make the charge the right order in the first place. And your point here is crucial:

It seems either of the possible interpretations of Raglan's order would have led the Light Brigade into trouble.

I completely agree. So does Adkin, who quotes what Lord George Paget actually said at the time: ‘If it be correct that the object of Lord Raglan’s last order was that the cavalry should… have made an advance along the Causeway Heights, to recapture the guns on the redoubts, then the nature of the ground must be considered; and I think I am right in saying that such an advance would have been attended with much difficulty.’ It would also have been dangerous, since at least the start of their advance would have been in range of the battery on the Fedoukhine, as well as of the Russian guns in battery at Kamara and along the Heights. If they went after Number 3, they’d have had the Cossack battery at them too, to say nothing of the Uhlan Lancers waiting beyond.

Some experts seem to be of much the same opinion, as in Colin Robins’ article here - http://crimeantexts.russianwar.co.uk/topics/crobins01.html. To me this is highly significant, because it suggests that it’s ultimately of little relevance what Nolan thought or did – the Light Brigade were anyway doomed. This, to me, is in itself another reason to question the highly convenient theory of ‘Nolan pointing the wrong way’. It focusses attention entirely on what a junior officer did, and diverts it from the commander who gave an order which was either way bound to end in disaster.

Louise

[jf42]

The Light Brigade at the Alma were already advancing up the Heights of Alma "

My apologies, the fairies in my laptop substituted 'Brigade' for 'Division.' However, the truth is my knowledge of the Alma is sketchy and I was simply extrapolating on the image you gave of the Light Division hurrying on up the heights.

I ought go away, read that article and think more carefully about how the possibility that the Russians were withdrawing from the Causeway Heights might have influenced Raglan and Nolan.

Had the British held that battery they would have controlled the Woronzoff and the Russian position in the redoubts would have become untenable. They would have been cut off from their battery on the Fedoukhine (which the Chasseurs took anyway), and as more British infantry arrived they’d have been surrounded on all sides.

I may have overstated the case, or rather, understated my scepticism. My thought was that cavalry were not equipped to hold ground for any length of time - certainly not the British cavalry in 1854. The only value of stationary cavalry is the threat of where it may go next.

Having taken the Cossack battery out of the battle for the time being, the survivors of even the Light and Heavy brigades together would have been unable to defend the battery position against counter-attack, far less affect the Russian defence of the redoubts - except by charging again! (At least the guns there would have been facing the wrong way).

As it is, when the Light Brigade advanced, the British infantry were still a long way from re-taking the Causeway Heights, let alone coming up to support what might have been left of the Cavalry Division at the bottom of North Valley (One of the reasons Raglan ordered the cavalry into action at that juncture was because the infantry were taking so long to get into position). By the time that might have happened, even the narcoleptic Russian cavalry would probably have ridden over them.

It is interesting that after the Light Brigade returned, Raglan abandoned any attempt to re-take the redoubts. I don't think this was because the Cavalry division wasn't where he wanted it, be it on the reverse slopes of Causeway Heights or down in the North Valley. Occupying ground was certainly not part of Raglan's order.

Of course, we have no idea what Raglan thought Lucan was meant to do even had he attacked the "right" objective and (after riding through the squares of Russian infantry and then over the redoubts), succeeded in preventing the captured guns being carried away.

Presumably, the cavalry would have had to withdraw with their prizes- or try (I still don't understand how the Russians were supposed to have been moving those guns) not least because eventually they would have been in the line of fire of the British attack from the south/southwest, would they not?

Yes. At the heart of the debacle is Lucan's doltish response to Raglan's vague orders and his decision to advance without reconnoitering to clarify the situation but it looks like the cavalry faced 'much difficulty' whichever way objective they attacked and in that light the question of Nolan's misdirection is something of a distraction.

If Nolan hadn't ridden forward and immediately been killed before his intentions became clear, then the generals would have had no opportunity to lay blame on an over-zealous ADC whose thoughts went with him to his dog's grave.

Of course, we are still left with the enigma of what those intentions and what those thoughts were... da capo al fino

[Swordswoman]

Enigma is right, and I think your conclusions are too.

Future speculation doesn't get us very far, and my analysis of what would have happened had the Heavies supported was faulty from the start because it assumed a commander who knew what he was doing. I think (and only think, because I've never been a soldier and lack the right perspective) that the Light Brigade had already confronted the counter-attack from the Cossacks and Uhlan Lancers, and that with the support of the Heavies they'd have beaten them off. True, the Russians still had infantry on the Causeway Heights to throw at them, but that would have meant withdrawal from the redoubts - at which point even the atrocious Lord George Brown might have seen a virtue in the Fourth Division advancing rather more forcibly. Even if he didn't, the Brigade of Guards was at the Col, and if there's one unit in the army that could have stormed the redoubts it's that one
But ultimately you're right. Raglan would probably not have ordered it, sulking Sir George Brown would probably have still advanced at four miles a fortnight, and idiot Cambridge would probably have hung back from committing Her Majesty's favourites into positive danger. I appreciate I'm commenting with the advantage of hindsight, and it's unfair to place too many structures on soldiers who were actually there, but honestly it's enough to make one weep.

But my apologies, because I also missed commenting on one of your most telling points - which is about the 'carrying away' of the guns. I can't remember offhand if the guns in the redoubts were naval, but guess they would have been because the British gunners left with the Turks to man them were certainly from the Naval Brigade. And you're right - such guns couldn't be limbered, but would need to be hauled away with some difficulty and probably by an ox-team. This, of course, is why the Russians weren't doing any such thing, and it becomes odder and odder that Raglan could have been led to believe they were.

But you're also right to raise the question that Nolan should have known from the phrase 'carried away' that these were the guns Raglan meant. I don't personally agree, because 'carried away' is the wrong phrase for either mode of removal, and in Victorian English is merely the correctly mealy-mouthed expression for anything from abduction to theft. It's exactly the phrase one would expect from a Victorian gentleman more familiar with the drawing room than the realities of a battlefield.

We still don't know. Ultimately there are very few things we do know, and there comes a point when speculation like mine becomes meaningless. All I feel strongly about is that speculation about Nolan has come in some quarters to be taken as fact - assisted, no doubt, by the 1968 film 'The Charge of the Light Brigade', which is a masterpiece of inaccuracy

In sum - Nolan MIGHT have accidentally pointed the wrong way, but it's extraordinarily unlikely, as anyone who's stood at the head of the North valley can testify. The London public might have swallowed it - but only in the same way as a Russian might think it credible for a man to stand at Charing Cross and indicate Whitehall when he meant the Mall.
Nolan MIGHT have done it deliberately as Adkin suggests, but he'd have also known the consequences of such an unprecedented act of disobedience, and (unlike us) could NOT know he would never live to face them.
Or Nolan might have misunderstood - which is my own contention. I can't ever prove that, but it seems to me overwhelmingly less unlikely - especially when we consider the context.

The danger with the Charge is that historians often study it in isolation, but once we exand the discussion to the whole campaign a lot of other things become clear. Raglan's confusing orders were potentially disastrous at both the Bulganek and the Alma, and in each case he was saved only by luck and the unbelievable courage of his soldiers. At Balaklava the courage of the Light Brigade again almost saved the day, but this time his luck had run out.

Tragic in any event. In the end, perhaps, that's all we can say.

Louise

[jf42]

the Light Brigade had already confronted the counter-attack from the Cossacks and Uhlan Lancers, and that with the support of the Heavies they'd have beaten them off.

H'm. Now that's an interesting point. I think it's fair to say the remnants of the Light Brigade managed, miraculously, to survive the presence of Rhyzhov's cavalry, whose morale appears to have been so shaken by repeated British refusal to accept imminent destruction that, for the second time that day, they allowed themselves to be driven back by an inferior force of British cavalry.

The Heavy Brigade coming up in support might well have compounded that success, even though presumably they too would have been in a fairly battered state, despite being spared the enemy fire from the Fedioukine Heights and, of course, from the Don Cossack battery.

Would their added presence have been enough to deter or even defeat a counter-attack by the Russian cavalry? A wargamer's question, I think. Somebody somewhere must have fought that scenario. It seems the Russians began to recover from whatever hypnotic effect the attack of the Light Brigade had upon them when they realised how few of the enemy were left. Perhaps they were influenced by pity or admiration. If so, that sentiment might well have dissipated once the need to drive the British cavalry back became clear, in order to prevent their comrades at the redoubts from being isolated and defeated in detail. There were about 20 squadrons in reserve available to do the job, if they could be concentrated, and the guns withdrawn in the face of the French attack up Fedioukine were still in play.

This is all wildly speculative but it does mean considering each of the pieces in play to help clarify what might have been in the minds of protagonists; their expectations and assumptions.

Certainly, one could speculate about the effect of the Cavalry Division tying up the Russian reserves while the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions advance to re-take the redoubts. But that didn't happen either!

The British gunners left with the Turks to man them were certainly from the Naval Brigade.

I read that the guns in question were 12-pounders from HMS Diamond. So, yes, how was it observers on the Sapoune Heights thought the guns were being removed when the logical thing would have been to turn them around to face Balaklava? Was that the movement observed?

Of course, that observers on the Sapoune Heights could make such an assumption supports the possibility that, from Raglan's point of view, having failed to capture Balaklava, the Russians appeared to be withdrawing rather than remaining to consolidate their hold on the Causeway and the Woronzoff Road. Was that wishful thinking?

Raglan's order "Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the Heights. They will be supported by infantry which have been ordered. does suggest a strange mix of complacency and wits-end. By then, the time for the Light Brigade to exploit the success of the Heavy Brigade had passed.

As far as 'carried away' is concerned, it is indeed that sense of appropriation or theft that leads me to doubt the order as it was written could have indicated anything other than captured guns. Presumably, Nolan was aware of the belief that the guns were being removed. If so, then that is where I have difficulty in accepting that he thought the Cossack battery was the objective Raglan intended.

However, if there is ambiguity on that point, then the possibility of his having misunderstood comes into play and, given that Nolan passionately felt the Cavalry should move in some direction and may have been sanguine as to the ability of the Light Brigade to execute such a task, then indeed, it may have seemed to him that "There were our guns, there were our enemy."

a Victorian gentleman more familiar with the drawing room than the realities of a battlefield.

By the way, is that not possibly being a little harsh on the good Lord Raglan? It may have been almost forty years before but the empty sleeve did indicate some experience of the battlefield- although not of actual command!

In sum - Nolan MIGHT have accidentally pointed the wrong way, but it's extraordinarily unlikely, as anyone who's stood at the head of the North valley can testify. The London public might have swallowed it - but only in the same way as a Russian might think it credible for a man to stand at Charing Cross and indicate Whitehall when he meant the Mall.

Nolan MIGHT have done it deliberately as Adkin suggests, but he'd have also known the consequences of such an unprecedented act of disobedience, and (unlike us) could NOT know he would never live to face them.

Or Nolan might have misunderstood - which is my own contention.

[/quote]

A vivid comparison. Yes. In the end, one must always go back to the ground and, yes, it is easy to get caught up in some notion of romantic self-immolation on the part of the real Nolan (unlike Errol Flynn's 'Vickers') who may have been quite satisfied at the thought of dying in the saddle but presumably would have preferred to survive.

For all the reasons you state, I agree with you absolutely that the idea of Nolan deliberately misdirecting the Light Brigade is not credible.

There is, though, the question of how Nolan was standing - or sitting- in relation to the objectives. A right arm carelessly flung back-hand is not as accurate as a penetrating forehand thrust. I seem to remember the 1968 film hedged their bets.

The idea of Nolan having misunderstood the order and then, perhaps, realising his error and inarticulately, incompletely, endeavouring to redress the situation is certainly the more convincing interpretation of that final spurring on.

To me, it is the mix of splendid regimental soldiering and inept, bumbling generalship that makes Balaklava, as the epitome of the Crimean debacle, such an extraordinary event. As is often said of soldiers, it may be that there was no place many of the men of the Light Brigade would rather have been that day than charging with their regiments. Perhaps for some, as for their mounts, it was stoic, courageous acceptance of their duty. Either way, it is the waste of such spirit that seems so tragic.

This is fun. After my own heart:
http://www.silverwhistle.co.uk/crimea/films.html

[L. Braden]

Pardon my interjecting this comment in what has been a brilliant analysis by Swordswoman and jf42, but it should not be assumed that the fact of the Lancers being on the left of the line and in the "direct" position necessarily had anything to do with the intended direction. Since Lancers were "shock troops" and would naturally have led the attack on the guns, it was a position of honour. There are many examples of this in British military history, wherein various battalions share the position of honour in a march or an attack - designated, for example, as "column of subdivisions [or half-companies, or column of threes or fours], left [or right] in front". But that had nothing to do with the direction of attack. For example, Col. Barter noted that during the march on Delhi the 75th were in column of fours, left in front, but when the action at Badli ki Sarai began, they were ordered to "take ground to the right by fours".
(Cont'd)

[almaboy]

Fascinating thread, and some good arguments on both sides.

I have to disagree on one point made though

I can't remember offhand if the guns in the redoubts were naval, but guess they would have been because the British gunners left with the Turks to man them were certainly from the Naval Brigade.

I believe the gunners helping the Turks to man the guns were from the RA. Several were decorated for their bravery with the French Medaille Militaire and were under strict instructions to spike the guns if they looked like being overrun, which they did.

Can't add anything to the Nolan debate though, you two seem to have got it covered

Tony

[L. Braden]

The commands "left in front" or "right in front" referred to which unit would lead in a march or an attack. Some more examples of many:
At the last phase of the battle of Cawnpore, Gen. Havelock ordered "The brigade will advance, left battalion leading," but the direction was straight ahead; and the 64th, which was on the left of the line, was given the honour of leading the attack, which the 78th did in the initial phase, when on the right of the column, which was advancing in column of subdivisions or half-companies, right in front, in direct echelon from the right.
(Cont'd)

[L. Braden]

At Waterloo, Mercer of the RHA noted that "my gallant troop stood as desired in column of subdivisions, left in front, pointing towards the main ridge" - at which they advanced.
At the Alma, according to Whinyates, a troop of the RHA initially "broke into column of subdivisions, left in front," but subsequently right-wheeled into action; and another troop "trotted in column of subdivisions, left in front," and went into "action front".
During the Burma War, Gen. Godwin's column advanced "in column of subdivisions, right in front," then inclined to the left for the attack.
And during the attack on Lucknow, Havelock changed the order of the column from right to left in front not because of direction, but to share the honour of the position among the deserving battalions.

[L. Braden]

Finally, Lord Roberts: "On the morning of the assault [on Delhi] the regiment [1st Punjab Infantry] had marched down to the rendezvous at Ludlow Castle, 'left in front'. While waiting for the Artillery to fire a few rounds at the breaches, the men sat down, and, falling in again, were doing so 'right in front'. Ruttun Sing came up to Lieutenant Charles Nicholson, who was commanding the regiment, and said: 'We ought to fall in "left in front"', thereby making his own company the leading one in the assault."
So, the position of a unit did not necessary indicate the direction of an attack, but rather the honour of leading it.