Why did the British Army fail in the 1st and 2nd Afghan Wars

[mugie1]

Hello,

I would be very grateful in anyone more informed on the topic might enlighten me please on why the British Army failed in both these wars?

Does anyone know anyone good internet sources to journals etc to research this topic?

And can anyone steer me in the right direction to any essential facts and points to mention when tackling this question.

Thank-you very much for you help

[mugie1]

sorry if it seems like such a general topic but any hints or tips would be very useful...

[Garen]

Hello there mugie1

A big subject! My area of interest is the Second Afghan War, so I won't comment on the First War except to say that my light reading on the history of the First war gives a very good account of why they failed - there are several books available on the subject (eg. Forbes).

The same goes for the Second war - read someone like Brian Robson for a good history. But I would offer this question to you - did the British fail in the Second Anglo-Afghan War?

When the British ignited the Afghan campaign in 1878 they antagonised an Afghan Khan (Sher Ali) that they probably didn't need to - he had been a pretty good, if independently minded, ally in the past. By the end of the campaign they were somewhat forced to accept a new Khan (Abdurrhaman) who would not have been their first choice but who ended up stabilising Afghanistan again for a good few years, and who kept the Russians away, just as the British desired.

Politically the British didn't exactly make any strides, but sort of got what they wanted. In the long run, however, they did not exactly endere the nation of Afghanistan - a nation that remembers its history and which has a bearing even today - with any British sympathies. Militarily speaking the Anglo-Indian forces were victorious in the vast majority of their battles in 1878-80.

Just a few thoughts. See my bibliography for some sources that may interest you.

[mugie1]

Thank you Garen,

This is most useful. My essay topic title is literally "Why did the British Army fail in the First and Second Afghan Wars"....I think the question is unhelpful to writing a good essay.

My reading is only on the First Afghan War so far, but I am yet to start reading around the Second War yet. From what you have suggested it seems best to argue that the Army failed in the First War to occupy Afghanistan, but in the Second War it was ultimately successful in the end apart from disasters such as Maiwand?


Do you know of any online sources/ or journals that may be useful.

Thanks for the bibliography, it is very comprehensive!

[SWB]

it seems best to argue

Surely the best argument is the one that you can construct and defend with your own research, not what is currently in vogue.

Writing good history is not about "best" (or worst) arguments but simply well presented research and facts to back up your conclusion.

I think the title is helpful in that it is broad and of course offers the great opportunity to question 'did the British Army fail'?

Can I ask if this is secondary school, graduate or post-graduate work?

Enjoy!
Meurig

[Garen]

My essay topic title is literally "Why did the British Army fail in the First and Second Afghan Wars"....I think the question is unhelpful to writing a good essay.

My reading is only on the First Afghan War so far, but I am yet to start reading around the Second War yet. From what you have suggested it seems best to argue that the Army failed in the First War to occupy Afghanistan, but in the Second War it was ultimately successful in the end apart from disasters such as Maiwand?

In my own view, I wouldn't exactly call the British invasion into Afghanistan in 1878-79-80 successful either. I think with the question "Why did the British Army fail in the First and Second Afghan Wars" I'd suggest positing the question where did the British army fail in the Second Afghan war? Or, if you need to stick to the question literally, put forward a case for the 1878-80 campaign being a failure - perhaps in the way it saw a short term benefit (if that's the right word) but longer term problems, or even that they 'failed' as soon as Samuel Browne stepped into the Khyber Pass in November 1878.

The thing to do is read up on the campaign, decide what the British aims were, see if they achieved those aims (or partially achieved those aims) and draw some conclusion from it.

It's difficult to isolate the wars completely with a question such as this. The First war created a political situation that informed the following decades, and those in turn informed the Second war. You need to look into things such as the various Anglo-Afghan treaties that were agreed in that interim too (eg. the Ambalah Conference) as well as Anglo-Russian relations and the various positions of the 'forward policy' advocates and the 'masterly inactivity' advocates.

Do you know of any online sources/ or journals that may be useful.

I don't really know of any online sources that would be useful for this question in particular - there's certainly no 'quick one-stop' read-up. My own site is here, but does not present a narrative of the campaign. The Times archive is very useful for contemporary news and views.

The best readily-available book, in my opinion, is Brian Robson's The Road to Kabul. I'd also recommend Hanna's three volume The Second Afghan War for a slightly critical contemporary (ish) account. There are also some good books that cover the wider history, though in less depth than the more dedicated focussed texts: Barthorp's Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947, Heathcote's The Afghan Wars 1839-1919, and Fremont-Barnes' Essential Histories: The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919.

If you can't find these books new, check out AbeBooks.

All best - Garen

[Liz]

I've come to this topic late because I've been offline focusing on other things. However, I'd endorse all of the advice given so far and I have two quick additional comments.

1. Your topic's emphasis on the actions of the Army is interesting, because in both wars the actions of politicians contributed heavily to if not dictated key events such as the 1841/42 retreat from Kabul.

2. When it comes to failures on a grand scale, such as the Retreat, there is usually a series of failures that need to be considered per the 'swiss cheese' model of accident causation popular in safety investigation.

All the best with your essay.

[mugie1]

Thank-you again for the help. Given that this topic is so broad, my challenge is to answer this question in 1800 words including footnotes but excluding my bibliography! It seems like such a small word count for such a massive topic

It is going to require some very concise arguments!

[mike snook]

A misleading question in so many ways: the first Anglo-Afghan War was fought by 'John Company' and the HEIC military - not by 'the British Army' at all. Similarly the Second Anglo-Afghan War was fought by the 'Indian Army' - not by the British Army. If you could back in time and see a division of either of these armies on the march, it would be immediately clear to you that you were not looking at a British Army, let alone the British Army. Neither army failed in any case. Contrary to popular myth, on neither occasion did the British lose the war. There were two well remembered disasters. Choose any theatre of operations in the world and there are always two British disasters associated with it! There is a mathematical inevitability about occasional military disaster - it is in the nature of war. Fight enough battles, and some proportion, no matter how good the army, will have an unhappy ending. People remember disasters much more readily than they remember handsome victories.

In the first war a brigade-sized force was compelled to retreat from Kabul in the depths of winter and was destroyed more by the weather than the enemy. There is no way that a brigade-sized force could prosper in a situation where the Afghan capital had risen against it. That there was much lamentable command and control paralysis in the run up to the denouement is more about the individuals in positions of responsibility, rather than widespread institutional failure: (though the failings of promotion by strict seniority, rather than some combination of seniority and merit, were very much an institutional problem at this time).

In the second war a brigade sized force was overwhelmed whilst unwisely engaging a force six or seven times its own size in open country - Brits 12 guns, Afghans 30 guns - so the artillery duel was lost from the outset and double envelopment on an open plain was only a matter of time. Apart from the Kabul episode and Maiwand, where small forces were left isolated as a function of strategic mismanagement, the 'British' (or more accurately substantially Indian) military went wherever it wanted, did whatever it wanted and, (moving its British units to the forefront whenever it really counted), thumped the opposition on countless occasions.

Were the central premise of the question true, it would be very difficult to address it in 1800 words. Because it is substantially untrue, rebutting the underlying premise is instead a very simple proposition. You could do it in 1200.

If you are writing your essay in the sub-continent, you may have to contend with post-colonial mythologising and 'counter-knowledge' - which might perhaps be a rather trickier proposition in 1800 words!

Regards

Mike

[grumpy]

accepting the above, 'to fail' is 'to not achieve the objective'. Ask the essay setter what the objectives were?

The general history of Afghanistan [not only vis a vis Britain] has been a cycle of:

Ruler[s] more or less OK and keeping Russia/ India apart
Ruler deposed/ murdered usually by a religiously inspired successor
Chaos, and possibility of Russian or other incursions
Indian/ British/ Other invasion, achieving some pacification, put malleable leader in power, bribe heavily, stand back
back to beginning.

Seem familiar?

Winston Churchill understood it well.

Rule One, the only Rule: leave Afghanistan strictly alone to fester in corruption and violence.

For India read India/Pakistan

[nicolass]

Just came across this forum and looked through the topics with interest, my interest with both the 1st and 2nd Afghan wars is due to members of my family having been involved, one which is noted on the plaque:

"Sacred to the memory of Colonel T. Mackrell, ADC to Her Majesty. Major W.B. Scott, Captain T. Swaine, Captain R.B. McRea, Captain T.R. Leighton, Captain T. Robinson, Captain F.C. Collins, Lieutenant W.H. Dodgin, Lieutenant W.G. White, Lieutenant W.G. Wade, Lieutenant H. Cadett, Lieutenant S. Swinton, Lieutenant F.J.C. Fortye, Lieutenant A.W. Gray, Paymaster T. Bourke, Lieut. and Qr. Master R.B. Halahan, Surgeon J. Harcourt, Assistant Surgeon W. Balfour, Assistant Surgeon W. Primrose. And 645 non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 44th Regiment, who fell upon the field of battle in the disastrous Affghan War of 1841 and 1842. They sank with arms in their hands unconquered, but overpowered by the united horrors of climate, treachery, and barbarous warefare; their colours saved by Captain J. Souter, one of the few survivors, hang above this stone, which is erected to their memory by the officers of the 44th Regiment, June 1844."

He kept a written diary of his time and experiences in the 1st Afghan war, this diary or at least a translated copy I have given to the Militray Museum, for the Essex Regt, recently. It may not answer all the questions in this topic area, but will give some idea to the life of an officer. The Diary consists of about Thirty pages and was eventually translated onto typed paper by my late father, took him many hours I would imagine.

Capt. Thomas ROBINSON's nephew, Maj. James Escourt ROBINSON (my G*Grandftaher) was posted to Afghanistan in 1879 and kept a diary for a year, his home regiment was the R.E. but he was seconded to another regiment as a young Lieutenant, so I believe.
Should anyone have details on either of the above individuals mentioned I would like to hear more.

Best Wishes

[Maureene]

The FIBIS Fibiwiki has pages called

1st Afghan War http://wiki.fibis.org/index.php?title=1st_Afghan_War and

2nd Afghan War http://wiki.fibis.org/index.php?title=2nd_Afghan_War

Included in these pages are links to a number of historical books which may be read online.

The preface of The Second Afghan War, 1878-80: Abridged Official Account published in 1908 advises that two earlier Accounts were considered too contoversial to publish!

Cheers
Maureen

[L. Braden]

As with the Sikh and Sepoy Wars, the Afghan Wars were joint ventures of the British and the British-Indian governments and armies; and although the latter declared and orchestrated these wars, the former sanctioned them; otherwise, the numerous British regiments that were involved would not have been deployed. Since these regiments were merely on a temporary and rotative loan to the British-Indian govt., in order to help protect and maintain British interests, they therefore remained part of the British Army, even though they adopted the British-Indian methods of marching and campaigning, etc. And as to whether the British won, lost, or tied: you have only to compare the OFFICIAL OBJECTIVES with the RESULTS, and you'll have your answers. Never mind all the pro- and anti-imperialistic propaganda; the facts of objectives and results speak for themselves.

P.S. I should add that the Gov.-Gen./Viceroy had discretionary power to employ British troops in an emergency, as during the first weeks of the Mutiny, but nonetheless pending subsequent approval by the Home Govt.; and if they didn't approve, he was subject to censure and possible recall--unless, of course, he could justify his actions to their satisfaction.