'Reasons why' - the enigma of Captain Nolan's intentions

[jf42]

Once more I have to confess, as I did not so long ago, that the details of command and manouevre such as you have provide are Greek to me without accompanying sketches.

I would, however, venture to differ that the 17th Lancers were, because of their lances, any more or less shock troops than the rest of the Light Brigade. Unlike the armoured lancer of the High Middle Ages, the 19th century Lancer was essentially a light horseman, although in Britain by 1854 the difference between Light and Heavy cavalry in terms of their respective roles had almost diminished to a question of styles of uniform, with both types expected to be "Equal to the charge in line." The attack on the Don Cossack battery at Balaklava was essentially a heavy cavalry action.

Back to those Lefts and Rights. I am unable to grasp on what basis Cardigan would have been according a notional honour to the 17th Lancers with his command "17th to direct." Of the two, the 13th Dragoons were the senior regiment in the front rank and, as would have been their privilege, held the right of the line although whether that was the rationale for the deployment, I am not sure. Had they not been ordered to fall back, the 11th Hussars would have been senior regiment in the front line. Would Cardigan have denied them their privilege, I wonder?

[EDIT: Since the 11th were positioned on the far left of the front line before being ordered to fall back into a supporting position, that last thought is redundant]

I may be out of my depth here. Let me establish a few basics. Before I flounder further, let me clarify for my own understanding: when a parade is about to move off and the preparatory command is given "By the Right" - or "By the Left"- what instruction is this giving to the troops?

[trooper]

The order for "17th Lancers to direct"would only indicate that the other regiments in the Brigade would keep position relative to the 17th during the advance, in other words the 17th would be the marker for the Brigade. Reference Nolan, one point that has not yet been mentioned is that of his anxiety to get the Light Cavalry involved in action. As a light cavalryman himself he had raged about Raglan's decisions regarding the cavalry all the way from the Alma onwards and would have been determined that this opportunity should not be lost. Being present with the staff on the heights he MUST have been aware of Raglan's intentions irrespective of the ambiguity of the written order, and gallopers were always given a verbal instruction in addition to the orders. His impatience manifested itself when, in reply to Lucan's query as to "What guns?" instead of replying "Those in the redoubts" he just jerked his arm in the general direction and said "there is the enemy, there are the guns". Whether or not he realised the mistake that had been made and tried to redirect the Brigade is, as is evident by this thread, open to debate, but he undoubtedly was trying to do something when he moved out of position and got killed.
One point of interest is Liprandi's report of the battle. according to him 2000 cavalrymen charged the guns but were repulsed by three squadrons of lancers and sent headlong into retreat leaving 400 dead, 60 wounded and 22 prisoners! Impressive. Trooper

[jf42]

[b][i]The order for "17th Lancers to direct"would only indicate that the other regiments in the Brigade would keep position relative to the 17th during the advance, in other words the 17th would be the marker for the Brigade.

That was my understanding and so it had the the same function as the instruction to an infantry formation- "By the right etc., " did it not?

We have touched earlier on Nolan's impatience to see the Light Brigade engaged. There can be no doubt that his frustration framed the ambiguity of his reply to Lucan's question, and the accompanying gesture.

{*EDITED}

[L. Braden]

It was Lucan, not Cardigan, who deployed the brigade; so the 17th were in the front line because they were Lucan's old regiment, "and because the lance when dropped to the 'Engage infantry' position was known to terrify opponents, lancers always rode in the front line" (Brighton). Lucan also ordered the 11th, Cardigan's regiment, back behind the 17th - an obvious affront, which C. vainly protested.
The dread of lancers was universal. Maj. S. Boulderson, 17th Lancers: "Such was the terror inspired by the Delhi spearmen, as they [the 9th Lancers] were called, that the enemy used to begin to run when they were miles away. For the Hussars they cared very little."
(Cont'd)

[L. Braden]

Quotes from Wikipedia and Google Books:
"By the late 19th century, many cavalry regiments were composed of troopers with lances (as well as sabres or other secondary weapons) in the front rank and men with sabres in the second, the lances for the initial shock and sabres for the melee."
"The lance is the best and most deadly weapon for all shock encounters."
"Lancers depended solely on shock."
"The lance has been proved to be the weapon best suited for the shock of attack."
"Some armies employed lancers as shock cavalry."
(Cont'd)

[L. Braden]

"The lance has a terrible moral effect upon the enemy, and without doubt is a most deadly weapon in the shock of closing squadrons, or the shock of cavalry against squares."
"We are lamentably deficient in lancers. ... We require them for shock action."
"Lancers were exempt from ordinary guard and escort duty. They were shock troops for the battlefield."
"Lancers' greatest use was shock troops against infantry squares."
"Lancers and uhlans carried a light lance, which was quite effective in shock action and pursuit."
(Cont'd)

[L. Braden]

Those who think that lancers were generally regarded as equal to swordsmen in shock value need to read the numerous accounts of those who had to encounter them, as well as the records of their effectiveness in action, and they need to ask themselves: "Would I prefer to be attacked by lancers rather than swordsmen?"
P.S. Swords were so ineffective in the Afghan and Sudan Wars that swordsmen were converted into lancers!

[jf42]

During the C19th there was certainly a body of opinion regarding the value of lance-armed cavalry corresponding to the opinions and anecdotes you cite but it is difficult to discuss those quotations out of context.

It would certainly be interesting to review examples of infantry squares being broken by light cavalry action.The usefulness of a lance to reach over the guard of an infantryman with fixed bayonet is self-evident but only infantry caught in line, as the 42nd were at Quatre Bras, seem to have been at serious risk from lancers. Certainly, a man on a horse with a long pole will have always have a certain advantage over a man on the ground with a shorter pole but it seems the best use for a lance was for pursuing men fleeing on foot who could not escape by throwing themselves on the ground, rebel Sepoys, for instance, or Cossack artillery men. Hardly shock action, though.

(The main advantage of the cavalry man was the speed and weight of his horse, not the specific arme blanche he carried. However, once one begins to look at the subject of cavalry shock action, it becomes clear that it is the focus of as many myths as the bayonet charge, a mythology that was still being embraced at the end of the C19th by professional soldiers who ought to have known better.

It seems that, over the centuries, if cavalry-on-cavalry contact took place it would often be with both forces at a virtual standstill. As with the bayonet charge, though, it seems more likely that one side or another would turn tail before the two forces closed or, in the case of cavalry, the two opposing bodies would simply ride though each other. The shock of two forces of cavalry meeting at full tilt would simply be too destructive for both sides.

The phrase 'full tilt' reminds us that the head-on charge to contact of cavalry was a romantic fiction generated in the tilt yards of the Middle Ages. The events of Balaklava challenge many of the commonly held clichés of cavalry: infantry in line defeating a massed cavalry attack; the Heavy Brigade "charging" Rhyzov's division at a trot; the giving way of Rhyzhov's cavalry once again before the impetus of a few Light Brigade survivors.)

However, the Light Brigade were not forming up to attack an infantry formation. The lances of the 17th would have been useful momentarily for winkling out Cossack gunners seeking refuge under their guns but, essentially, the Light Cavalry neutralised the Cossack battery simply by reaching it with a sufficient number of survivors, at which point the advantage of the individual mounted soldier over the foot soldier came into play. Beyond the battery, the 17th found their lances less effective against mounted opponents armed with swords. Equally, the Russian lancers blocking the survivors' way home were brushed aside with remarkable ease.

My impression is that Lucan's role in the deployment of the Light Brigade was limited to ordering the 11th Hussars to fall back from the first line. A deliberate slight to Cardigan might be inferred but is not proven. It might as easily have been Lucan's native tactlessness. True, Lucan's adjustment to the brigade deployment demonstrated his obsessive need to exercise the authority that he had been struggling to establish since he had landed in Bulgaria.There is a sense, however, that once the implication of Raglan's order (as they understood it) became clear, the seriousness of the occasion momentarily caused both men briefly to concentrate on the matter in hand.

All in all, to return to the point in my previous post, Cardigan's order- "17th Lancers to direct"- still seems unlikely to have been the result of a desire to honour 'Bingham's Dandies' for their lance-armed role. Particularly since Lucan had just so tactlessly ordered Cardigan's darling 'Cherrybums' out of the front line.

[L. Braden]

Great post, jf42! I thank you indeed for it, and I agree with you entirely. As in the past, I have deliberately played the part of devil's advocate in order to ferret out the truth from all the myths and misconceptions. For as many champions of the lance, there were just as many detractors (Nolan himself, for one!); and the lance and its use had a number of disadvantages that often made it an impractical or almost impractical weapon except for those with exceptional skill. As you noted, its only notable advantage (especially in Asian and African warfare) was in nailing men on the run or on the ground (or lying in ambush) and out of sword-reach. Otherwise, like the over-touted bayonet, it was merely a bugbear with "moral effect" - the effect of making men run rather than stand and fight. Thanks again, and keep up the good debunking work!

[jf42]

It is indeed an intriguing subject. And legends are by their nature so beguiling.

[Swordswoman]

What a brilliant discussion, and I’m sorry to be coming back so late to it. My first Crimean novel came out this week and things have been a little hectic.
I’m too thick to work out how to ‘multi-quote’, so please forgive me if I miss anything crucial in this response after the first post.
Which was jf42’s:

As far as 'carried away' is concerned, it is indeed that sense of appropriation or theft that leads me to doubt the order as it was written could have indicated anything other than captured guns. Presumably, Nolan was aware of the belief that the guns were being removed. If so, then that is where I have difficulty in accepting that he thought the Cossack battery was the objective Raglan intended.

That's absolutely fair. All I would say is that no-one disputes Nolan’s use of the word ‘your’ when referring to the guns – nor thinks it surprising that Lucan should have interpreted this as meaning Russian guns. A sense of appropriation is right, but would perhaps equally apply if the enemy were taking away guns an army considered already ‘theirs’ (‘your’) for the taking.

a Victorian gentleman more familiar with the drawing room than the realities of a battlefield.

By the way, is that not possibly being a little harsh on the good Lord Raglan? It may have been almost forty years before but the empty sleeve did indicate some experience of the battlefield- although not of actual command!

Yes, absolutely. I was being snarky and unfair. Raglan had indeed seen active service, and all I really meant by this was to admire the wonderfully gentlemanly phrasing. Even Kinglake agrees it was the biggest criticism levelled at him out there, that he was too polite to ever say exactly what he meant in case it looked as if he was giving an order…

For all the reasons you state, I agree with you absolutely that the idea of Nolan deliberately misdirecting the Light Brigade is not credible.
There is, though, the question of how Nolan was standing - or sitting- in relation to the objectives. A right arm carelessly flung back-hand is not as accurate as a penetrating forehand thrust. I seem to remember the 1968 film hedged their bets.

Agreed - and this is what trooper refers to too - that ‘he just jerked his arm in the general direction’.
But do we have a particular source for this carelessly flung backhand? It’s not consistent with what I’ve read, where neither Lucan nor interpreter Elijah Blunt had any doubt where Nolan was pointing. If he’d indicated the Causeway Heights, he’d have been pointing upwards and right, but clearly he was pointing leftward and down.

‘His lordship exclaimed attack and where and what guns Sir. Nolan pointed with his sword towards the end of the Valley and cried out “There My Lord is your enemy, and there are your guns.”’ (Blunt)

The more I think about this idea of ‘Nolan pointing the wrong way’, the odder it seems. For years I just accepted it, because I’d seen it in the 1968 film, but now I look at it even that seems wrong. Here’s the still from the film.

Nolan 4.jpg (9.43 KiB) Viewed 809 times

Who points like that? Without even looking? Ask someone you know to point at something, and I bet you they’ll look first. The director had to make David Hemmings do it that way to preserve the idea of Nolan’s mistake, but I find it really hard to believe that’s actually what he did. He could have, I can’t rule it out – it’s just hard to believe.

Almaboy – Thank you. You and jf42 are absolutely right about the gunners, and I have this quite the wrong way round. The guns were (at least partially) from the Diamond, but the gunners came from elsewhere. It was ‘W’ Battery who supplied five gunners to the redoubts (sources: Adkin and Kinglake), and the gunner in Number 1 certainly spiked the guns there before the retreat. There seems to be some doubt about Number 2.

L. Braden – That’s a really fascinating discussion of infantry manoeuvres, which I have to confess I know very little about. This will be incredibly useful for me, and I’m sure many others.
But as you and jf42 have so convincingly argued, the Lancers (despite their vital importance) would not have necessarily been given the position of honour – and nor was anyone in this advance. The Lancers and 13 LD advanced absolutely level, as would be usual in such a charge. Cardigan needed to spread his men out over the widest possible front in order to limit the effect of the battery in front, and so apparently he did. Simpson’s painting was produced in consultation with Cardigan, who refused to be satisfied until he himself was clearly visible out in the lead, but I know of no reason to doubt its accuracy in other respects.

Charge of LB.jpg (46.07 KiB) Viewed 809 times

If this is the case, then neither regiment is in front, and as I think you’ve already concluded, the order for the Lancers ‘to direct’ could mean only that other regiments were to adjust their own position to theirs.

Trooper – More excellent and helpful points. I confess, however, to being less certain that Nolan would have known what Raglan intended simply by being present on the Sapoune. It’s a huge, long ridge, and Raglan could easily have been out of earshot when he dictated the order. You’re quite right, of course, that a verbal instruction should have accompanied it, but Raglan was notoriously bad about this, which is why at the Bulganek, Alma AND Inkerman he had to send second officers after the first with instructions to make the original order clear.

Only Somerset Calthorpe insists proper clarification was given –

‘Before departing [Nolan] received careful instruction from both Lord Raglan and the Quartermaster General’ (Calthorpe)

but I’m not the first to point out that Calthorpe was not only Raglan’s junior officer, he was also his nephew. I’m not sure how much weight we’d give his evidence in a court of law today.

I still can’t believe in ‘Nolan's turn’ either, but if I make this post any longer I’ll break the board. Sorry for such a lengthy rant, and I’ll be back in a bit with the rest.

Louise

PS jf42 - I love the silverwhistle link - but am in shock at the revelation that Captain Nolan was ugly! Maybe I'll stop defending him after all...

[Swordswoman]

Last one, I promise. But I’ve been doing a bit more digging round the subject of Nolan’s famous ‘turn’, and think it’s well worth revisiting. We have so many accounts of it, and I thought it might be helpful to quote some of the most significant for everyone to see.

With apologies for a shockingly bad scan, here’s Kinglake’s official version, together with the diagram provided by an anonymous officer, claiming Nolan was definitely moving from left to right, as if to change the direction of the Brigade.

Kinglake on Nolan1.jpg (41.16 KiB) Viewed 808 times

The account is typical Kinglake - deducing what he only thinks happened from what 'we now know'. Only with hindsight does he see 'significance' in Nolan's look and gestures.
As for the diagram, I really wish we knew who drew it, because his account doesn’t fit with anyone else’s. The closest is Cardigan’s account, given in his statement to Kinglake:

‘After advancing about eighty yards, a shell fell within reach of my horse’s feet, and Captain Nolan, who was riding across the front retreated with his arm up through the intervals of the brigade.’ - Cardigan

But in what direction was he riding? Cardigan makes no suggestion of a specific diagonal turn. His very first account speaks more of ‘galloping about’ as if with no specific direction at all:

‘Captain Nolan, who was galloping about in front at about the distance of 100 yards from the Light Brigade, and in no way leading the charge, was killed by a shell.’ - Cardigan

This is confirmed by Calthorpe:

‘Poor Nolan galloped some way in front of the brigade, waving his sword and encouraging his men by voice and gesture. Before they had gone any distance the enemy’s guns opened on them at long range. Nolan was the first man killed.’ – Calthorpe

I am, however, doubtful of Calthorpe. He was presumably still on the Sapoune, and even with a field glass I very much doubt he could have seen much detail. I suspect he is only doing what he often does, and obediently repeating what was said by his superior officer.

So what did the others make of Nolan’s ‘galloping about’?
Morley claims initially he rode from the 13th LD to the 17th Lancers – which would have been right to left.

‘I was only about 70 yards from Captain Nolan and distinctly saw every movement… As soon as the brigade was fairly in motion… Nolan rode away from the 13th at speed… reached a position in front of the centre of the 17th, gave his order “threes right” with his horse’s head facing the regiment, at the same time waving his sword to the right, which signified “take ground to the right”, then turned and galloped towards the Causeway Heights. At that moment a shell exploded…’ - Morley

True, he does say that Nolan afterwards turned for the Causeway Heights (ie right) – but I have to say it seems quite extraordinary. Why ride from the 13th just to shout the order then turn to ride back? Or was this just more of the apparently random ‘galloping about’?

That he WAS in front of the 13th to start with is supported by Albert Mitchell:

‘We had not proceeded far when the batteries right and left were enabled to reach us, and almost before we had struck into the gallop, poor Captain Nolan (who rode in front of our regiment) was struck by a piece of shell which burst near him. He uttered a fearful cry; at the same time his horse turned about and made for the rear through our squadron interval.’ – Mitchell

Mitchell’s usually ignored evidence is hugely significant, because he claims Nolan was struck while he was still in front of the 13th Light Dragoons. If he’s right, any movement after that point could be entirely attributed to the panic of the horse, whose master was dead on its back.

That fits with a letter to the Times by Fitz Maxse, Cardigan’s ADC, part of which I’ve already quoted:

‘I have no recollection of his’ (Nolan’s) ‘divergence in the manner described by Mr. Kinglake either by deed or gesture until after he was struck.’ Fitz Maxse, italics mine.

That partially fits with Nunnerley, who saw Nolan

‘ride up to Captain Morris, then commanding the 17th Lancers, to whom he said “Now, Morris, for a bit of fun!” Scarcely had he uttered these words than he was shot, being at the time on [my] left front. After giving a kind of yell which sounded very much like “Threes right,” and throwing his sword-hand above his head, his horse wheeled to the right and he fell to the rear.’ - Nunnerley

Nunnerley contradicts Mitchell, by placing Nolan in front of the 17th at the time, but his account still makes clear that both Nolan’s movement and the cry that only SOUNDED like ‘Threes Right!’ were made after he was hit.

Frankly it’s a mess. No two accounts exactly agree, and most were given long after the event. Morley’s is by far the most damning, but we’ve already mentioned that his whole account is riddled with hearsay, and so full of hindsight he claims to know even what Lucan actually thought. Besides, if he was 70 yards away from Nolan I find it really hard to believe he was the only one who saw so precisely what happened. Maxse, riding behind Cardigan, would have been much closer.

But there’s another version - the detailed and reliable account of John Wightman. I do find him especially credible because he’s honest enough to admit to what he didn’t see as well as what he did:

‘We had barely ridden 200 yards and were still at the trot, when poor Nolan’s fate came to him. I did not see him across Cardigan’s front, but I did see the shell explode of which a fragment struck him. From his raised sword-hand dropped the sword, but the arm remained erect. Kinglake writes that “what had once been Nolan maintained the strong military seat until the erect form fell out of the saddle” but this was not so. The sword-arm indeed remained upraised and rigid, but all the other limbs so curled in on the contorted trunk as by a spasm, that we wondered for a moment how the huddled form kept the saddle. It was the sudden convulsive twitch of the bridle hand inward on the chest that caused the charger to wheel rearward so abruptly. The weird shriek and the awful face as rider and horse disappeared haunt me now to this day, the first horror of that ride of horrors.’ – Wightman

With this in mind, we can find at least a handful of facts on which there seems to be real consensus:

Nolan was moving about to the front of the regiments before he was hit (Cardigan, Calthorpe, Morley, Mitchell, Wightman)
Nolan gave a fearful cry when he was hit (Nunnerley, Mitchell, Wightman)
Nolan’s sword arm went up when he was hit (Cardigan, Mitchell, Nunnerley, Wightman)
Nolan’s horse wheeled and went back through the squadrons when he was hit (Cardigan, Mitchell, Nunnerley, Wightman)

They’re also about the only statements NOT contradicted by Maxse, who was the man closest.

The confusion must have been appalling, and all these men must have been ragged with nerves. I’d say it was at least possible that Nolan’s death cry might have been mistaken for the order ‘Threes Right!’, as Nunnerley claims – especially as he was still in the saddle and apparently waving his arm. If he’d fallen off when he was hit there’d be none of this confusion, but as it is we’ll never know.

All I think we can say is that the evidence for the intentional attempt to turn the Brigade is far from conclusive – and flat out denied by the man who was closest. Personally I think Nolan was indeed ‘galloping about’ encouraging the men –this would explain why witnesses of both the 13th LD and the 17th Lancers place him at some time in front of their own regiments. I can see no evidence of any divergence from this behaviour until after he was hit – when its wild nature needs no further explanation.

But that’s only an opinion.

Louise